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Introduction 
 
 
'How is it', asked Joseph Longford, former British consul in Japan, writing in 1905, 'that a 
people who are daily offering to the world lessons….. in patriotism of the very highest order, 
in self-sacrificing devotion to all the interests of their country, in courage and in an 
administration of all the departments of their Government that is as unimpeachably honest 
as it is efficient, should nevertheless have a reputation for commercial morality as low as it is 
in all other respects deservedly high?'1 Longford was not the only observer of Japan at this 
time seeking an answer to this question. Accusations of a deficiency in commercial morality 
– what would now probably be termed as low standards of business ethics - were a constant 
refrain in Western observations on Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Japan's reputation in international commercial dealings was that of a nation whose citizens 
were prepared to cheat and deceive in the interests of personal gain, and whose standards 
of trading behaviour were inferior not just to industrial powers such as Britain and the United 
States, but to those that prevailed in many developing countries as well. The objective of this 
study is to identify where these accusations came from, what kind of evidence they were 
based on, and how the Japanese themselves responded to them. 
 A great deal has been written across the centuries about the morality or otherwise of 
moneymaking and profit, and more recently about philanthropy and the use of profits, and 
the extent to which even illicitly obtained monies can be legitimately used to benefit others. 
In the British case the philanthropic and paternalist entrepreneurs of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, for example Quaker businesses such as Cadbury and Rowntree, have 
garnered considerable attention. However, while the worst excesses of business behaviour 
from Jay Gould through to Enron and Toshiba have hit the headlines, far less attention has 
been paid by scholars to the standards of honesty or dishonesty adhered to by local 
economic actors and small businesses as they conducted their transactions on a daily basis. 
And yet the extent to which producers and traders at all levels abided by, or flouted, 
accepted standards of behaviour for economic transactions, mattered profoundly for the 
growth of national and international trade. What also mattered was the extent to which these 
producers and traders, on both the individual and aggregate level, were perceived as 
adhering to accepted standards; such perceptions might not necessarily be aligned with the 
reality of what was going on, but could nevertheless dictate attitudes and even policy. The 
reasons why it mattered were complex, but included the potentially far-reaching damage to 
                                               
1 Joseph H.Longford, 'The Commercial Morality of the Japanese', Contemporary Review 87, 1905, 
p.705. For Longford see Ian Ruxton, 'Joseph Henry Longford (1849–1925), Consul and Scholar' in 
H.Cortazzi (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, vol.6 (Folkestone, Kent: Japan 
Society/Global Oriental, 2007), pp. 307-14. 
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individual and national reputations, the difficulty of engaging in repeated transactions where 
one partner could not be trusted, and a general undermining of trust in a capitalist economy 
increasingly dependent on credit and fewer face to face contacts. 
The accusations that were levied against Japan were informed by the discourses on 
commercial morality that had evolved within the industrialising economies of the West, and 
had become particularly conspicuous in Britain and the United States in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. From the British perspective the accusations against Japan were in 
part the outcome of a perceived failure on the part of many Japanese to act in accordance 
with the standards that the British themselves had set down, standards that were associated 
with ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’, notwithstanding an acknowledgement that Western 
businessmen were themselves not immune to breaching those same standards. The 
criticisms were informed by an inclination to cultural stereotyping, which treated individual 
behaviours as representative of whole peoples, and led to sweeping comparisons regarding 
the commercial morality of different nations. 
It will also be suggested, however, that the complaints came in response to the 
circumstances of global trade during this period, a global trade that was dominated by the 
industrial economies of Western Europe and North America, and characterized by a highly 
unequal balance of power in international economic relations. At the same time this was a 
period of the transnational spread of ideas and business practices in the context of cultural 
difference and increasing global economic competition. The Japanese, who were essentially 
newcomers to international trade from the late 1850s, had evolved their own business 
practices, but were now expected to play by the Western rules of the game; the scope for 
genuine misunderstandings of what was appropriate was matched only by the scope for 
manipulation on both sides of the transaction. The specific environment of the treaty ports, 
through which, until the late 1890s, Japan's international trade was conducted under the 
terms of the so-called unequal treaties, further enhanced available opportunities for 
misunderstanding and manipulation. As Japan progressed along the path to becoming the 
first non-Western industrialised economy, and increased her involvement in international 
trade, some Western producers also became increasingly fearful of the prospects of 
Japanese competition, and drew on earlier criticisms as part of the articulation of their more 
immediate concerns. This interaction raises the very topical questions of how established 
players in the international economy respond to the challenges posed by new interests that 
seem to threaten their dominance, and how less powerful trading partners and newcomers 
to international trade can make their way in the face of powerful vested interests, including 
by the adoption of 'short cuts' in order to do so. Analysing Japan in the context of the global 
debates on business ethics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus 
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suggests some insights into the broader relationship between ethical business practice, 
business success, illegal conduct and moral behaviour. 
But how important were these criticisms from the Japanese perspective? Certainly 
they mattered. Britain, probably Japan's most vocal critic, was one of Japan's largest trading 
partners from the 1860s through to the 1920s, followed closely by the United States, another 
strong complainant.2  The negative perceptions of Japanese goods and Japanese methods 
of business had the potential to damage Japanese trading possibilities just as the country 
was seeking to consolidate its position in overseas markets. Increasing Japanese exports 
was regarded as vital to Japan's ability to import the necessary raw materials and energy for 
industrialisation, and the inflow of ideas and technology from more industrialised economies 
on which that industrialisation depended. Had the dominant European and American 
economies sought to implement any kind of boycott of Japanese goods or other sanctions in 
response to the perceived bad behaviour they would themselves have had little to lose; it 
would have been Japan that suffered. Nor does it seem likely that these countries would 
have unduly suffered had their exports to Japan declined. It was Japan, therefore, that was 
the most likely loser in these controversies. It is in that context that we find a Japanese 
response that sought to explain instances of bad behaviour by Japanese nationals by 
reference to Japan's historical circumstances and the manner of its integration into the 
international economy, but was also committed to trying to ensure that such instances of 
unethical business practice were minimised in the future. The response, in short, embodied 
a recognition that Japan had little choice but to play by the Western-dictated rules of the 
game. 
In order to shed light on these debates the focus here will be on the interaction 
between the discourses on commercial morality and the actual circumstances in which those 
discourses – in both the West and Japan - evolved.  Exploring any broader debates on 
ethics and business lies beyond the scope of this study, although it must be recognised that 
attitudes towards the relationship between ethics and business, and towards the extent to 
which business activity was undertaken for the greater good, and not just for individual self-
interest, certainly impacted on the debates under discussion here. As will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, however, the term 'commercial morality' was largely used with 
reference to the ways in which individuals undertook business transactions, for example the 
ways in which they drafted and adhered to contracts, the extent to which they ensured that 
                                               
2 Britain accounted for 20-50% of the value of Japan’s imports through to the First World War, while 
the United States took the major share of Japan’s exports by value through to the Great Depression. 
See Janet Hunter & S.Sugiyama, Economic and Business Relations, vol.IV of History of Anglo-
Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp.17-18; Miwa Ryōichi & Hara Akira 
(eds.), Kingendai Nihon Keizai Shi Yōran (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, rev. edition, 2010), 
p.25. 
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goods were of an appropriate quality, or their willingness to respect the intellectual property 
rights of others. It was in these respects that the Japanese were deemed to be deficient in 
appropriate business conduct. 
In this context it is worth making three general points. Firstly, the increase in 
international transactions during the nineteenth century raised the issue of the existence of 
multiple standards for judging business conduct – determined by local cultures and mores – 
and the absence of a single, universally accepted global standard. As global transactions 
grew, this problem became more acute. Secondly, the increasing complexity of business 
transactions and the associated growth of credit that supported nineteenth century 
industrialisation facilitated cheating, and made it easier for many to get away with it. This 
ability to avoid some of the most serious consequences of bad behaviour was in part due to 
the third factor, namely the failure of formal institutions, including legislation, to keep up with 
changes in the economy and the increased opportunities for malpractice that they offered. 
This is clearly evidenced by nineteenth century debates in Britain about the extent to which 
the law could be used to address problems of commercial immorality, but debates over the 
role of legislation in delivering ethical business conduct are found across countries. The 
borderline between illegality and immorality was, and remains, both unclear and permeable. 
By the time that something has been made illegal things have moved on, and individuals 
have found new ways of manipulating a new set of opportunities.  
This combination of the existence of multiple standards of acceptable commercial 
behaviour, the increasing complexity of economic transactions and the limitations of formal 
institutions was fundamental to the interaction between discourse and economic 
circumstances that will be discussed in the three chapters that follow. The first will discuss 
the emergence in the early nineteenth century of British debates on what was referred to by 
contemporaries as 'commercial morality', a term that continued in widespread use through to 
the interwar decades. While there was a long tradition of Christian-informed debate on 
morality and business, and there were published injunctions to good practice in business, 
the context of British industrialisation in the early nineteenth century provoked increasing 
concerns about fraudulent business practice facilitated by enhanced opportunities for 
cheating, as the number of long distance impersonal transactions increased and the growing 
complexity of financial and economic mechanisms rendered transactions more and more 
opaque. In Britain debates on the extent to which immorality in business activity was distinct 
from actual illegality, and the relationship between short-term profit and longer-term benefits, 
were fuelled by a wave of company collapses and bankruptcies in the 1860s, a number of 
which were attributed to fraud and speculation. Cheating, it was suggested, might deliver a 
quick profit, but it could also jeopardise longer term business success by limiting the 
opportunities for repeated transactions and causing reputational risk. The issues were 
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discussed widely in local chambers of commerce, in parliament, and in the national and local 
press. The practices that were associated with low levels of commercial morality were not 
always spelt out, but included behaviour such as the failure to deliver goods on time and the 
issuing of false credit notes. Similar debates began to emerge in the more industrialised 
economies of Western Europe and in the United States, where the cases of the so-called 
'robber barons' raised widespread discussion of the more or less acceptable ways in which 
fortunes might be amassed. Almost everywhere commentators sought to clarify links 
between the prosperity of an economy, the growth of credit, and the question of trust and 
broader ethical practice. While the main focus in the discussion here will be on Britain, in line 
with its leading role in international trade, reference will also be made to equivalent debates 
in other European countries and North America.  
The second chapter will consider how the debates on commercial morality that 
focussed largely on activity within Western countries came to be applied to international 
transactions, and in particular their application in the case of Japan. It was often unclear 
what standards of morality might be expected in the conduct of international business. Some 
businessmen in Britain, for example, appeared to take the view that cheating foreigners was 
acceptable in a way that cheating your own fellow countrymen was not, and more generally 
defining what was appropriate practice in an international, multicultural business world 
proved extremely difficult. Differences in cultural norms and practices thus became a key 
element in the Western criticisms of Japan that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. It was broadly assumed in countries such as Britain, of course, that all other 
countries should abide by the Western-dictated rules. They tended to feel that a failure to 
adhere to ideal Western standards of commercial morality (whatever they might be) was 
essentially an indicator of a lack of 'civilisation'. What emerged in the Western discourse was 
thus effectively a global hierarchy of commercial morality roughly parallel to a country's 
perceived progress towards 'civilisation'. In this hierarchy developing economies were 
towards the bottom, while the most industrialised countries were at the top. However, 
despite its obvious progress towards industrialisation, and its growing international 
recognition (Japan formally became a British ally in 1902), Japan remained firmly at the 
bottom of the commercial morality hierarchy, as evidenced by Longford's statement at the 
start of this introduction. A reputation for cheating and fraud persisted from the earliest days 
of treaty port trade through to the 1930s, and re-emerged in the decades after the Pacific 
War. A stereotyped image of the fraudulent Japanese merchant (and by implication the 
deceptive nature of all Japanese) was reiterated through official reports, newspaper and 
magazine articles, and travelogues. The chapter will analyse the complaints that were made 
against Japan, and identify what foreigners actually meant when they deplored Japan's 
inadequate commercial morality, looking at the specific business practices that gave rise to 
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the accusations of immorality. Discussion of the better known complaints of unfair 
competition and cheap labour made against Japan in the 1930s lies beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but it will be shown that the earlier criticisms laid the foundations on which the 
later complaints were easily built. 
The final substantive chapter will look at the view taken by the Japanese themselves 
of these criticisms, and the ways in which they explained and responded to them. What is 
striking about the response of Japan's business and political leaders to the criticisms that 
were levied at Japanese commercial interests is that at least up until the First World War the 
majority appears to have accepted the veracity of the Westerners' criticisms. While there 
were some disagreements about the causes and extent of unethical practices by Japanese – 
the general belief was that the phenomenon of dishonest traders was in large part the 
consequence of traditional Japanese attitudes to merchant activity, combined with the 
particular circumstances of the treaty ports, in which Western merchants were hardly models 
of probity – statements about the behaviour of Japanese merchants frequently mirrored 
those articulated in the West. It was acknowledged that the bad behaviour of the few could 
tarnish the nation's reputation, and that at least for the time being Japan had to play by 
Western rules. Members of the elite shared the view that standards of commercial morality 
could be expected to rise as part of the progress towards 'civilisation', but were at the same 
time concerned at what appeared something of a paradox, namely that Japan's commercial 
behaviour was regarded as inferior to that in other countries compared to which they 
believed Japan was in most respects highly advanced, such as China. It was therefore 
essential, they agreed, that concrete steps be taken to address this perceived anomaly. 
Those concrete steps were explained and justified not so much on the basis of morality 
being a good thing and desirable in itself, but on the grounds that even though cheating 
might lead to individual profits in the short term, it was highly detrimental to the national 
interest and the future of the Japanese economy over the longer term. For many, therefore, 
the pursuit of higher standards of business ethics was instrumental to the bigger project of 
the growth of the national economy and the achievement of international status. 
  Analysis of the commercial morality issue, whose influence on Japanese-Western 
economic relations persisted into the postwar period, therefore offers insights into the 
complex interaction between cultural difference, the transnational spread of ideas and 
business practices, and global economic competition. As will be noted in the Conclusion, the 
story resonates with contemporary debates relating to institutional change, culture and value 
systems, and their operation in the context of an expanding global economy facilitated by 
complex financial and credit systems whose operation is often hard to monitor. It suggests 
also that complaints about ethical business practice of the kind that were persistently levied 
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at Japan may be the lot of any emerging global competitor that challenges the economic 
power of the status quo.  
 
